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This article examines the role of lay decision-makers in American prosecutors’ 
case preparation. Drawing on ethnographic research, it focuses on the creative and 
collaborative process by which prosecutors develop and revise opening and closing 
statements for trial. I argue in Part I that these narratives are keyed to perspectives that 
prosecutors attribute to hypothetical jurors. Part II focuses on the relationship prosecutors 
articulate between particular narrative techniques and jurors’ perceptions of their 
character and evidence. The central empirical finding is that prosecutors formulate and 
negotiate narratives about their cases with continual reference to jurors’ potential 
interpretations of them. This interactional process of critique and revision reveals the 
contingent and reflexive nature of prosecutorial discretion. It also offers a window into 
the social knowledge that prosecutors draw on to anticipate how jurors might scrutinize 
their work.  
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American prosecutors’ opening and closing statements are often concise, 
polished, and recited from memory by the time jurors hear them. Ethnographic research 
in federal prosecutors’ offices, however, reveals that the process of creating such 
narratives is far from neat. They are often written in fits and starts: drafts are emailed, 
printed, returned with suggested changes, revised, re-circulated and critiqued aloud 
during meetings with colleagues. This was true, for example, of an opening statement that 
a prosecutor named Mark prepared for United States v. Caprica, a mortgage fraud case. 
Hunched over a pile of notes in a windowless conference room, he glanced up from 
scattered pages on the table in front of him. His audience of prosecutors, meanwhile, 
looked past him at an image projected on a retractable screen. It was an aerial photograph 
of a destroyed building.1 
 
 
                  
                                                      
1 This photograph of a similar gas explosion was taken by Adnan Islam and is available here: 
https://www.flickr.com/photos/adnanbangladesh/13107208504/ under a Creative Commons license.  
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Mark’s colleagues set cell phone timers and peeled their legal notepads to fresh 
pages. The story began:  
 
It was two o’clock in the afternoon when 2850 Beach Street exploded. It was a 
gas explosion. The building was leveled by a powerful, violent blast. One woman 
died and five others were critically injured. It shook the entire block. Homes all 
the way down the street had their windows blown out and building number 2850 
no longer existed. The defendant knew about the explosion, and that this property 
ceased to exist. It was all over the local news all day. But the evidence will show 
that the defendant stood to gain hundreds of thousands of dollars by pretending 
the building was still there. 
 
The defendant, the theory went, saw the explosion as an opportunity. Posing as a loan 
officer, he could pocket money for the building’s fictitious sale. He did this by submitting 
fraudulent mortgage loan applications to banks on behalf of straw buyers. For each loan 
obtained through this scheme, the defendant took a commission for himself.  
Beginning the story with a pile of rubble and casualties, however, was a novel 
narrative flourish. Though the image appeared on screen only briefly, it remained on 
Mark’s colleagues’ minds as they responded with suggestions:  
 
– It’s confusing. When you’re sitting there, you think it’s a case about arson, or 
national security, or weapons of mass destruction…  
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– It’s a powerful picture. It has shock value… it’s a question of when you want to 
deploy it. 
 
– Let’s go back to the vignette. How do we shorten the vignette? I’m reading it [in 
reference to a printed draft of the opening] and I’m just not sure how to shorten 
it.2  
 
These reactions highlight several issues that are central to this article. First, they 
illuminate the collaborative process by which lawyers negotiate and re-make narratives 
about their cases. They also reveal prosecutors’ attention to the perspectives of future 
listeners. This particular case, like most in the office, did not proceed to trial. 
Nevertheless, prosecutors oriented their preparation around perspectives that they 
imputed to hypothetical jurors. 
 This study draws on long-term participatory research in three United States 
Attorney’s offices in a federal district in the Northeast United States.3 In 2010 I served as 
a legal intern in the largest of these offices before returning to carry out anthropological 
research between 2013 and 2017. This included interviews with 133 Criminal and Civil 
Division prosecutors and participation in 68 case preparation meetings. It also involved 
participant observation, which entailed the long-term study of prosecutors’ everyday 
work by contributing to it.4 This sustained and immersive approach, which is 
characteristic of ethnographic research, was facilitated by my training as a lawyer and 
                                                      
2 Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (Jan. 28, 2014). 
3 The general location of these offices is identified for the benefit of researchers who wish to extend this 
case study to other parts of the country to examine regional differences among U.S. Attorney’s offices.  
4 See e.g., Annelise Collateral Knowledge: Legal Reasoning in the Global Financial Markets. (Chicago, 
Chicago University Press 2011), p. 11 for discussion (and use) of a similar ethnographic approach.  
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admission to the bar in states that included the site of this fieldwork. To preserve the 
anonymity of all prosecutors and cases, I have changed or coded their names. 
 Though it is beyond the scope of this analysis, my broader argument is that 
prosecutors negotiate and formulate the meaning of their professional imperative to seek 
justice with reference to real and imagined jurors. 5 I contend that prosecutors draw on 
jurors’ hypothetical perspectives to bring clarity to their ideas about just prosecutions and 
the values that support them.6 This article, more specifically, addresses jurors’ influence 
on prosecutors’ organization of their legal expertise and other forms of knowledge as 
narratives. This included prosecutors’ local knowledge about ordinary peoples’ lives as 
well as their intuitions about how these citizens might assess their credibility. After 
briefly situating the study of legal narratives-in-progress in the context of emergent 
interdisciplinary research, Part I examines the extent to which opening and closing 
statement preparation was oriented toward future jurors’ hypothetical perspectives. Part II 
focuses on the relationship prosecutors articulated between particular narrative 
techniques and jurors’ anticipated perceptions of their character and evidence. As 
prosecutors discussed the stakes of proposed revisions, they gave explicit and implicit 
definition to the limits of their discretion. 
 
                                                      
5 Am. Bar Ass'n, ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: §3-1.2(b) “The primary duty of the prosecutor is to 
seek justice within the bounds of the law, not merely to convict"; Berger v. United States” 1934 p. 88; “The 
United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty 
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose 
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.”; 
63C Am. Jur. 2d 2013.  
6 This finding complements anthropologists’ observation that identity formation is an interactive and 
“contextually situated” process that emerges through real time discourse See e.g., Matoesian, Gregory M. 
Law and the Language of Identity: Discourse in the William Kennedy Smith Rape Trial. (Oxford; New 
York, Oxford University Press 2001), p. 166; Keane, Webb. Ethical Life: Its Natural and Social Histories, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press 2015), p. 78; Bashkow, Ira. The Meaning of Whitemen (Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press 2006), p. 20.  
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Narrative-creation as an object of ethnography 
 
 Analyses of legal narratives can conceal the inherently contingent, collaborative, 
and improvisational character of legal practice.7 This is because much scholarship 
focuses on outcomes (e.g., verdicts, judicial opinions) and adopts backward-looking 
reasoning from already settled ends.8 Clifford Geertz describes this analytic tendency as a 
“‘how-to’ bias” that treats the effects of legal practice as constitutive of law more 
generally.9 Emergent interdisciplinary studies of legal narratives, however, increasingly 
capture their dynamic and contingent character, shaped by rules and principles that legal 
actors deploy differently.10 For anthropologists and scholars in adjacent fields, these 
insights stem from an understanding of legal practice as dialogic, interactive, and 
collaborative.11 Through this lens, even in-court statements begin to look like products of 
                                                      
7 Cormack, Bradin. Power to Do Justice : Jurisdiction, English Literature, and the Rise of Common Law 
1509-1625 (Chicago, University of Chicago Press 2008), p. 1; Shapiro, Martin “On the Regrettable Decline 
of Law French: Or Shapiro Jettet Le Brickbat.” Yale Law Journal, January 1980, p. 1201; Sarat, Austin, 
and Felstiner, William L. F. “Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law Talk in the Divorce Lawyer’s 
Office.” The Yale Law Journal 98 (8) 1989., p. 1682; Coutin, Susan Bibler. Legalizing Moves : Salvadoran 
Immigrants’ Struggle for U.S. Residency (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press 2000), p. 122; see also 
Scheppele, Kim Lane “Facing Facts in Legal Interpretation.” Representations, no. 30 April 1990, p. 60. 
8 Roland Barthes helpfully characterizes this process as one of “retrospective prophes[y]” Barthes, Roland. 
A Barthes Reader. (New York 2009). p. 225; see also Ginzburg, Carlo. Clues, Myths, and the Historical 
Method. (Johns Hopkins University Press 1992). 
9 Geertz, Clifford. Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology. (New York, Basic 
Books 2000), p. 233; Pirie, Fernanda. The Anthropology of Law (Oxford 2013), pp. 67-68 suggesting that 
anthropologists have a tendency to examine "what law does" rather than what law is; Foucault, Michel. The 
Order of Things: An Archaeology of Human Sciences (Random House 2012), p. 267. 
10 Wilson, Richard Ashby. Writing History in International Criminal Trials (Cambridge University Press 
2011), p. 109; Yngvesson, Barbara. Virtuous Citizens, Disruptive Subjects: Order and Complaint in a New 
England Court. (Routledge 1993), p. 45 referring to law as a variously deployed "resource" in local power 
struggles; Greenhouse, Carol and Kheshti, Roshanak. Democracy and Ethnography: Constructing Identities 
in Multicultural Liberal States (SUNY Press 1998), p. 15. 
11See e.g., Riessman, Catherine Kohler in Inhorn, Marcia C. and van Balen, Frank (eds.) Infertility around 
the Globe: New Thinking on Childlessness, Gender, and Reproductive Technologies. (University of 
California Press 2002); Brookman, Fiona in Presser, Lois, and Sveinung Sandberg, eds. Narrative 
Criminology: Understanding Stories of Crime. (New York Univ Press 2015), p. 3; Yngvesson supra note 
12, pp. 228-230; Hill, Jane H. Responsibility and Evidence in Oral Discourse (Cambridge University Press 
1993), p. 1, 4; Bauman, Richard “Verbal Art as Performance” American Anthropologist 77 (2) 1975, p. 
302; Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhaĭlovich, Wright, Jay and Holquist, Michael. The Dialogic Imagination: Four 
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co-narration in which multiple narratives fuse to produce a “public story.”12  
 Likewise, legal language has been studied as a medium for different possible 
outcomes, drawing on a repertoire of discursive strategies.13 Divorce lawyers’ speech 
offers a compelling example, revealing how invocations of formalist, equitable, and 
realistic conceptions of law inform the interpretive frames that such attorneys selectively 
present to their clients.14  And some scholars set aside consideration of legal outcomes 
altogether, focusing instead on the uncertainty of verdicts.15  
 Unlike analyses that treat lawyers’ trial narratives as static objects of analysis, the 
creation of such stories is a significant context for ethnographic study in its own right. 
One prosecutor analogized his focus on jurors’ perceptions of opening statements to his 
process of evaluating FBI agents’ case pitches early in an investigation. “It’s almost like 
the script is flipped,” he explained: 
 
I’m now the jury and the agent is trying to convince me it's something worth doing 
                                                                                                                                                              
Essays (University of Texas Press 1981), pp. 293-294; Jacoby, Sally, and Ochs, Elinor. “Co-Construction: 
An Introduction” Research on Language & Social Interaction 28 (3) 1995, p. 175; Duranti, Alessandro 
“The Audience as Co-Author: An Introduction” Text - Interdisciplinary Journal for the Study of Discourse 
6 (3) 1986, p. 241; Goffman, Erving. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (New York [N.Y.]: 
Doubleday 1990); Hall, Stuart. Representation : Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices 
(London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage in association with the Open University 1997), p. 235 noting that 
meaning is generated through interaction with an "Other." 
12 Richland, Justin B. Arguing with Tradition: The Language of Law in Hopi Tribal Court (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press 2008), pp. 118-119; 1997; Ochs, Elinor, and Lisa Capps. Living Narrative: 
Creating Lives in Everyday Storytelling (Harvard University Press, 2009), pp. 57-58, 95, 242;  Sarat, 
Austin, and Felstiner, William L. F. Divorce Lawyers and Their Clients: Power and Meaning in the Legal 
Process (Oxford University Press 1997), pp. 17-18; Bauman in Silverstein, Michael, and Urban, Greg 
Urban (eds). Natural Histories of Discourse (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1996).  
13 See e.g., Sarat, Austin, and Felstiner, William L. F. in Levi, Judith N., and Anne Graffam Walker (eds.) 
Language in the Judicial Process (Springer 1990), p. 136.  
14 See Sarat and Felstiner supra note 9; see also Hirsch, Susan F. Pronouncing and Persevering: Gender and 
the Discourses of Disputing in an African Islamic Court (University of Chicago Press 1998); Ng, Kwai 
Hang. The Common Law in Two Voices: Language, Law, and the Postcolonial Dilemma in Hong Kong 
(Stanford University Press 2009).  
15 Amsterdam, Anthony G., and Randy Hertz “Analysis of Closing Arguments to a Jury,” New York Law 
School Law Review, 37 (1992), p. 56 analyzing the language used during closing statements in a 1991 
homicide prosecution in New York which emphasizes the uncertainty of legal outcomes.  
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and the same process is taking place. I may not consciously be thinking to myself 
“what will a jury think of this” but what I am saying to myself is “is this the kind of 
thing we should be concerned about?” When you put yourself in this position, 
you’re put in the position of a jury thinking, “what kind of appeal is this going to 
have?”16  
The sections that follow demonstrate that prosecutors’ critiques of colleagues’ trial 
narratives are rooted in the similar imaginative exercise of anticipating jurors’ reactions 
to them. 
 
I. Jurors at the center of opening and closing statements 
 
Jurors’ potential interpretations of evidence were at the heart of prosecutors’ 
discussions of case narratives. Although accessing jurors’ impressions was an inherently 
speculative endeavor,17 prosecutors nonetheless developed robust beliefs about their 
future lay decision-makers.18 In some cases, prosecutors explicitly identified “average” 
jurors as individuals who were middle-class, employed, and lived in the suburbs.19 In 
other cases, prosecutors’ understandings of jurors stemmed from knowledge of family 
                                                      
16 Interview with CZ, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, ( July 15, 2013), his emphasis. 
17 Cf., Participation in meeting with CZ during which a prosecutor said he learned jurors’ first-hand 
impressions from a post-trial meeting that was permitted in another jurisdiction where he worked as an 
Assistant District Attorney (May 5, 2017); see also Discussion with BG, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, (May 23, 2017) 
during which a juror who served as an alternate in a case wrote a letter to the judge before the defendant 
was sentenced. 
18 See e.g., Zalman, Marvin and Tsoudis, Olga, “Plucking Weeds From the Garden: Lawyers Speak About 
Voir Dire,” 51 Wayne L. Rev. 163 2005. 
19 Offit, Anna “Peer Review: Navigating Uncertainty in the United States Jury System”, UC Irvine Law 
Review Vol. 6, Issue 2, June 2016. p. 180, by one prosecutor’s account, average jurors “‘go to work every 
day, have 2.5 kids, drive a Ford Taurus, and have a white picket fence.’” 
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members or friends who shared characteristics in common with them (e.g., occupations, 
counties of residence) and were thus regarded as proxy jurors.20  
When it came time to prepare opening and closing statements, the distinction 
between prosecutors’ interpretive capacities and those of the jurors they imagined was 
ambiguous at best. Lawyers, in other words, became surrogate jurors for each other. For 
some, the aim of preparation meetings was to discuss and refine language that might 
resonate with laypeople. For others, presentation style was a narrative priority, as 
prosecutors likened themselves to teachers. In both cases, jurors’ perspectives were 
invoked and imaginatively enacted by prosecutors as part of a practice of distancing 
themselves from cases to offer critiques from a position of detachment.  
 
1. Crafting language with jurors in mind  
 
Several prosecutors emphasized the importance of using analogies in opening 
statements that jurors might relate to. This included a lawyer who kept a list of details 
about jurors in front of her during opening statements and throughout trials. “If I have 
carpenters or teachers on my jury,” she explained,  
 
I will try to phrase arguments to connect personally with them. If I am talking 
about money laundering or a narcotics trafficking organization utilizing a black 
market exchange I might focus jury addresses on something like “the tools of the 
trade of a narcotics officer…” or “just like a carpenter has a hammer, nails, 
                                                      
20 Id. pp. 198-199; See e.g., Participation in meeting with EM, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, (May 5, 2017) during 
which a prosecutor acknowledged that jurors’ reactions to a bank robbery surveillance video might 
mirror those of her trial partner. 
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pens…” to engage them individually. “Just like a nurse has medicine…” you 
address jurors keeping in mind all the time what their individual lives are like.21  
 
While preparing for a trial two years later, the same prosecutor said that she could tell 
when jurors were receptive to her metaphors by observing their “eyes light up” as she 
connected with them as individuals.22 Even if jurors did not find such references 
persuasive, another prosecutor explained, they might at least pay attention.23 When 
another prosecutor noted that several members of a jury were parents she made a 
conscious effort to use analogies involving children, likening the use of circumstantial 
evidence, for instance, to concluding that a child had eaten cookies after noticing crumbs 
on his face, chocolate on his breath, and an empty, open cookie jar beside him in the 
kitchen.24  
In the similar spirit of keying language used in opening and closing statements to 
jurors’ likely experiences outside the courtroom, another prosecutor weighed presentation 
styles that future listeners might be receptive to. “If you have a teacher or an auto 
mechanic,” he explained,  
 
it is going to affect your argument in different ways. If you have a teacher, you 
want to be the outstanding student with answers to every question. If you have an 
engineer you want to give facts, weights, and percentages. If it’s a hockey player 
                                                      
21 Interview with DN, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, ( July 18, 2013). 
22 Interview with DN, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, ( Aug. 12, 2015); see also Interview with CH, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, 
( Jul. 8, 2013) commenting “I like to think of a jury as my jury and I like to relate to them. I like to know 
who they are.” Her emphasis. 
23 Interview with BT, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, ( Jun. 28, 2013). 
24 Participation in meeting with AY and BQ, Ass’t U.S. Att’ys, (Aug. 13, 2013). 
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you might use more aggressive language. You want to know that so you can craft 
the message. You don’t move the facts around, but you adjust the presentation.25 
 
Consideration of jurors’ divergent backgrounds thus prompted creative discussion of how 
cases might appear to unfamiliar observers. Recognizing that people rely on analogies to 
reconcile informational gaps in everyday life, 26 prosecutors eagerly reframed evidence to 
align with knowledge systems that might bring clarity to sources of confusion in court.  
In other cases, efforts to engage jurors were more explicitly aimed at advancing 
particular interpretations of significant evidence. In a civil suit, for example, a prosecutor 
tasked with defending the United States made a point of referring to a record of 
communications between an air traffic controller and pilot as a partial transcript rather 
than a transcript. This “definition”— as he referred to it— was significant because it 
underscored the incompleteness of the interactions the jury learned about in court; the air 
traffic controller was responsible for up to eight airplanes at a time. The plaintiff, in 
contrast, referred to an edited version of the transcript that made it appear as though the 
airplane at issue was the sole focus of the employee’s attention.27 Despite the infrequency 
of jury trials in civil cases, this prosecutor recognized the stakes of neglecting jurors’ 
potential adoption of the language used throughout a trial. Here, as part of his strategy, 
the prosecutor implicitly highlighted an aspect of the story that jurors were not privy to.  
 Other prosecutors mined jurors’ responses to voir dire questions for clues about 
how to characterize evidence that might strike a layperson as counterintuitive. To 
                                                      
25 Interview with BJ, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, ( June 26, 2013). 
26 Rosen, Lawrence. Law as Culture: An Invitation (Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 9; Lakoff, 
George, and Mark Johnson. Metaphors We Live By. (University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 119; Douglas, 
Mary. How Institutions Think. (Syracuse University Press., 1986), p. 65. 
27 Interview with BY, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, ( July 2, 2013). 
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disabuse jurors of the notion that fingerprints and DNA evidence were essential 
components of criminal investigations, for example, a prosecutor revisited her notes on 
jurors’ television habits. If many of them reported watching crime shows like “CSI”, she 
incorporated this fact into her opening statements. Unlike popular legal dramas, she then 
explained, jurors would learn from experts that DNA rarely solved cases in real life. By 
commenting on jurors’ exposure to fictionalized law enforcement work, she hoped to 
manage their expectations and anticipate questions that might arise during their 
deliberations.28 In the context of a child abuse case, a different prosecutor prepared for a 
closing statement by revisiting the voir dire responses of jurors who believed that 
children could love parents who abused them. In his view, invoking jurors’ 
understandings of the complexity of abusive relationships might bolster his own common 
sense argument that the defendants’ intermittent expressions of warmth and affection did 
not mitigate their guilt.29  
 In an effort to use language that might resonate with jurors, prosecutors 
recognized the importance of drawing on local knowledge when formulating their 
arguments. Some accessed this knowledge by drawing on vocabulary from divergent 
professional registers (e.g., analogies tailored to carpenters, nurses, or athletes) or from 
opinions elicited during voir dire (e.g., related to DNA evidence and abuse). 
Consideration of jurors’ perspectives thus blurred lay and professional expertise— both 
of which permeated prosecutors’ talk and decision-making.  
 
                                                      
28 Interview with BU, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, ( July 1, 2013); Participation in meeting with AW, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, 
(May 4, 2017) during which a supervisor encouraged the deliverer of an opening statement to emphasize 
details about DNA evidence in a bank robbery case because they affirmed public confidence in law 
enforcement’s technological capabilities. 
29 Interview with BQ, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, ( June 28, 2015). 
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2. Making evidence intelligible to lay decision-makers  
Opening statements, which could range from 10 minutes to several hours, were 
selective by necessity; they sounded more like previews than fulsome stories.30 For the 
prosecutors who practiced, critiqued, and ultimately delivered them, this was by design. 
These statements were intended to offer jurors a “broad brush”, “bare bones” 
understanding of the charges and evidence in cases and to pare down complex or 
unpredictable testimony into simple narratives.31 A benefit of this approach, as 
prosecutors saw it, was the possibility that concise narratives would be more compelling 
and memorable than detailed or long-winded ones. To refine their stories, prosecutors 
critiqued each other’s presentations from the vantage point of hypothetical lay decision-
makers. This meant that suggestions for revision could be articulated in impersonal terms 
as prosecutors scrutinized evidence with fresh eyes. It also assumed that prosecutors’ 
concerns could be substituted in conversation for those of future jurors.32  
Nevertheless, thus aided by colleagues, many prosecutors viewed their task in 
crafting opening statements as one of making the facts of a case and elements of a crime 
intelligible to an imagined lay audience.33 As part of this effort, which some viewed as 
central to their job, prosecutors encouraged each other to transform evidence into “sound 
bites of key information”34, “simple thought[s]”35, or language that a juror “could 
                                                      
30 In advance of trial, judges sometimes encouraged parties to adhere to time limits for their opening 
statements to keep the proceedings on schedule; see also Observation of trial proceedings (Sept. 19, 2016). 
31 See e.g., Participation in meetings, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (April 19, 2017; June 7, 2013).  
32 Cf. Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (May 4, 2017) during which a colleague cautioned a 
trial team that “weak” characterizations of evidence in an opening revealed their “own subjective anxiety 
about the case” rather than evince confidence that jurors would find the evidence “devastating.” 
33 Participation in meetings, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (June 7, 2013; Sept. 3, 2013; Jan. 8 2015).  
34 Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (June 7, 2013). 
35 Participation in meetings, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (July 1, 2014; April 19, 2017).  
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reasonably digest.”36 As one prosecutor explained, “the more you can define factual 
issues to the jury and define the facts of the case they’re going to have to decide, the 
easier it will be for them and the easier it will be for you.”37 Another prosecutor referred 
to his professional obligation to translate legal language for laypeople as a “burden of 
coherence.” Viewing this responsibility as a narrative burden, he added that 
 
to the extent there are gaps and there are holes in what we can explain or in what 
we can make comprehensible to the jury, that’s to our detriment. Anything— if 
you’re missing a shoe, to analogize it, that’s to my detriment… Anything that is 
out of kilter contributes to doubt.38  
 
Others conceptualized the task of teaching jurors about their cases as part of their duty to 
“close logical loops”39, “connect the dots”,40 “marry up” different aspects of a crime,41 and 
“lay out” why particular pieces of evidence were significant.42 Exemplifying this 
approach, a supervisor suggested that paragraphs of an opening statement in a bribery 
case be revised to sound like a primer for jurors.43 Here, again, the imagined perspectives 
of individuals who lacked professional training helped prosecutors assess evidence in 
their cases anew.  
                                                      
36 Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (June 9, 2013); see also Discussion with DN and DH, 
Ass’t U.S. Att’ys, (May 23, 2017). 
37 Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (June 19, 2013); see also participation in meeting with 
CZ, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, (April 25, 2017). 
38 Interview with BE, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, ( June 21, 2013). 
39 Participation in meetings, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (Oct. 9, 2014; Jan. 8, 2015).  
40 Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (Oct. 17, 2016). 
41 Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (Jan. 28, 2015). 
42 Participation in meetings, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (June 7, 2013; Oct. 22, 2016).  
43 Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (Feb. 21, 2017). 
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To aid jurors’ comprehension of cases, “colloquial,” “conversational,” “down to 
earth,” “plain” and “everyday” language was prized; prosecutors sought to craft stories in 
terms used and heard outside of court.44 During preparation meetings for fraud, drug, and 
gun cases, for example, prosecutors’ critiques of opening statements distinguished 
between the level of precision and detail one might expect from a written brief and oral 
story. In a brief, a prosecutor explained, it might be appropriate to list the monetary 
values of dozens of loans or note the number of days between transactions. In the context 
of an oral opening statement, however, quantitative description did little to contribute to 
jurors’ understanding.45 In this prosecutor’s view, an opening suffered for being “too 
wordy, too legalese, and too complex.”46 A similar argument surfaced in a gun 
possession case in which a prosecutor was told: “This sounds as if you wrote it as 
opposed to ‘let me tell you what happened…’ like you’re just talking to the jury. If you 
were just telling them what happened, you’d use different words. It would sound different 
from the way it would if it was a scholarly lecture.”47  
For some, this approach presumed that jurors who failed to understand evidence, 
or got lost in its detail, might mistake their confusion for defects in a case.48 This was 
                                                      
44 See e.g., Interview with BS, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, (Dec. 1, 2015); Interview with DK, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, (Dec. 
1, 2015); Interview with AA, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, (July 8, 2013); Interview with DA, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, (Feb. 
6, 2015) commenting on the importance of using “vocabulary that would resonate” with jurors; Interview 
with AA, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, (Feb. 6, 2015); Interview with AB, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (Feb. 
6, 2015); Interview with CH, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, (July 8, 2013) “Tell them a story they can understand and 
get them to believe in you, because you believe in what you’re saying”; Participation in meetings, U.S. 
Att’y’s Office, (Jan. 8, 2015; March 4, 2015). 
45 See also Participation in meeting with AA, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, (May 4, 2017) during which a prosecutor 
discouraged the deliverer of an opening statement from emphasizing quantitative DNA test results in favor 
of colloquial phrasing. 
46 Participation in meetings, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (Jan. 8, 2015; Feb. 21, 2017; April 19, 2017). 
47 Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (April 3, 2014), his emphasis; see also Participation in 
meeting with BS, Ass’t U.S. Att’y (Dec. 1, 2015) noting that an opening statement in a drug case sounded 
like a “beautifully written brief” rather than a story.  
48 Interview with AZ, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, ( June 21, 2013); Interview with AW, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, ( June 20, 
2013); Interview with BD, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, ( June 21, 2013; Oct. 19, 2014). 
 18 
true, for example of prosecutors who tried RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act) cases and worried that if jurors heard a story involving numerous 
defendants their confusion might lead to acquittals.49 To this end, one prosecutor 
critiqued a colleague’s presentation for portraying his case as too “nuanced and detailed” 
and not straightforward enough.50 
A case that involved the theft and shipment of cars prompted a similar response 
from a colleague who thought that 
 
the details in the beginning really jump out but I think the opening is too detailed. 
This is a simple case. Name the steps. Step one: the car is stolen. Step two: you let 
the car cool off by leaving it on the street. Step three: you clean the car. Then you 
warehouse it and change the VIN number. After the warehouse you put the car in 
[a] crate. It’s a process with five basic steps for how to steal a car.51 
 
Earlier in the discussion, a different colleague commented that the jury, like him, might 
be confused by the fact that homeland security officers had authorized the stolen car’s 
shipment as part of their investigation. There was consensus that this detail did not “make 
the cut” for the opening; its deliverer was persuaded that it would raise more questions 
for jurors than it would answer and “ultimately, you want the jury to understand.”52 
Prosecutors sometimes elaborated aspects of cases that could not easily be distilled into 
simple stories, pointing out that defendants made sophisticated efforts to conceal their 
                                                      
49 Interview with BV, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, ( July 1, 2013). 
50 Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (June 7, 2013). 
51 Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (June 7, 2013). 
52 Id. 
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wrongdoing. For example, one prosecutor explained that a fraud case took him hours to 
understand: “I put up a slide that looks incredibly complicated and I say ‘look at this. The 
defendant made this complicated so that he wouldn’t be here today.’ So I embrace the 
complexity.”53  
In the cases outlined above, references to jurors’ fictive perspectives informed 
prosecutors’ critiques of colleagues’ language use. In the process, prosecutors sometimes 
clarified aspects of cases for themselves. A 10-minute opening statement for a child 
pornography case, for example, prompted discussion of substantive legal questions. “You 
described child pornography as child sexual abuse,” a colleague commented after a run-
through. “Isn’t that just a subset of child pornography?”54 In the discussion that followed 
prosecutors fluidly tacked back and forth between their need to refine legal 
characterizations of sexually explicit images for lay listeners and for each other. Requests 
for a “better road map,” topic sentences, and colloquial definitions highlighted the jury’s 
role as an editorial resource and context in which legal knowledge was tested and 
exchanged.55  
 
II. Formulating justice while forming a story 
 
In his essay The Narrative Construction of Reality, Jerome Bruner highlights the 
interplay between narrative form and normative commitments. Citing Frank Kermode, he 
                                                      
53 Interview with BJ, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, ( June 26, 2013), his emphasis. 
54 Participation in meeting with FI, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, (April 25, 2017).  
55 Id.; see also Polanyi, Livia. Telling the American Story: A Structural and Cultural Analysis of 
Conversational Storytelling (Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press). 1989. p. 93 for a relevant 
discussion of “interactively constructed” meaning in conversational storytelling. 
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underscores the role that narratives play in rendering the world orderly and intelligible.56 
In a similar fashion, prosecutors’ collaborative construction of opening and closing 
statements imposed order on ambiguities in their cases and professional commitments. As 
prosecutors critiqued colleagues’ case characterizations they explicitly and implicitly 
distinguished narrative approaches that embodied personal and professional character 
traits they viewed as essential to their work. As this section demonstrates, prosecutors’ 
self-consciousness about their perceived reliability and fairness featured prominently in 
their discussions. 
 
1. The prosecutor as credible author  
 
 Prosecutors recognized the role that opening and closing statements played in 
building and maintaining jurors’ trust.57 In practice, however, they took divergent 
approaches to demonstrating their credibility and articulated distinct professional values 
in the process. This included ensuring that opening statement narratives aligned with 
evidence jurors would see or hear during trial, conveying their preparedness, assuming 
responsibility for educating jurors about federal law, and foregrounding corroborating 
evidence.  
 During discussions of opening statements, in particular, prosecutors spent time 
                                                      
56 Bruner, Jerome. “The Narrative Construction of Reality” Critical Inquiry 18 (1) 1991; Kermode, Frank. 
The Sense of an Ending; Studies in the Theory of Fiction (Oxford University Press 1967); see also 
Mitchell, W. J. Thomas. On Narrative (University of Chicago Press 1981); Lévi-Strauss, Claude. The 
Structural Study of Myth (University of Pennsylvania 1955); Mattingly, Cherly and Garro, Linda C. eds. 
Narrative and the Cultural Construction of Illness and Healing. (University of California Press, Berkeley 
2000), pp. 11-25.  
57 See e.g., Discussion with HD and DN, Ass’t U.S. Att’ys (May 23, 2017). 
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scrutinizing the specificity and accuracy of their characterizations of evidence.58 
Underlying this effort was an assumption that a juror whose expectations were betrayed 
by later inconsistencies would call a prosecutor’s character— and therefore arguments— 
into question. The stories prosecutors fashioned for jurors were thus regarded as 
“commitments” or promises to them.59 Violations of this trust were referred to as 
problems of “overcommitting”, “overselling,” or “overpromising” in opening 
statements.60 The excerpt below illustrates the conversational process by which 
prosecutors shared and critiqued the narratives they expected witness testimony to later 
support. The defendants in the case were charged with using a firearm to steal a car:  
 
Vaughn: Ok. So you don’t know who was standing on what side of the car or 
who said “get the fuck out of the car”? Be slow and deliberate: “The victims saw 
a shotgun and heard the words ‘get the fuck out of the car’ and, ladies and 
gentlemen, this is the shotgun they saw.” Have the victims seen the gun? 
 
Stacy: They say… the defendant was wearing a long— a trench coat and that he 
held the gun in front of him upright— in the middle. The female says she doesn’t 
really know guns but she says her husband does and that it’s not a handgun. That 
it’s long and black… 
 
Vaughn: Ok. They say black? 
                                                      
58 See e.g., Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (Jan. 8, 2015). 
59 Participation in meeting with AA, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, (April 17, 2014). 
60 See e.g., Participation in meeting with ED, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, (Feb. 21, 2017); Participation in meeting 
with AD, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, (June 19, 2013); Participation in meeting with AJ, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, (May 4, 
2017); Participation in meetings, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (April 19, 2017; Oct. 9, 2014; Jan. 8, 2015). 
 22 
 




Jeff: You don’t want [defense counsel] holding the gun up and saying “have you 
seen this before?” and the victim saying, “I don’t think so. I don’t really know.”  
 
Vaughn: Definitely prepare them for that.61  
 
Anticipating that jurors might not hear evidence clarifying who held the gun, a supervisor 
and colleague suggested that the deliverer of the opening statement highlight the 
insignificance of the detail she could not commit to. “The defendant is criminally 
responsible for using a gun in furtherance of a carjacking…,” the supervisor said, 
rehearsing a proposed revision of the narrative aloud. “The evidence will show that even 
if Chris didn’t tell you that Brent, himself, carried the gun, Chris and Brent are both 
criminally responsible.”62 A colleague added that a succinct way to help the jury “pull all 
the evidence together” was to note that the defendant “acted consistently with someone 
who knew the gun was there.”63 
Where prosecutors positively reinforced precise language,64 vagueness was a 
source of disagreement.65 This is because the extent of a particular word or phrase’s 
                                                      
61 Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (July 1, 2014).  
62 Id.  
63 Id., his emphasis.  
64 Participation in meeting with DA, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, (Feb. 6, 2015). 
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ambiguity was negotiable. In one case, a prosecutor’s appeal to “common sense” was 
perceived as signaling that the trial team’s evidence was insufficient, requiring that jurors 
make an excessive inferential leap to convict a defendant.66 Common sense, in this 
lawyer’s view, was too indeterminate and subjective a metric for lay decision-makers. In 
another case, a prosecutor criticized a colleague’s suggestion that jurors might “hear 
things” during the trial that departed from his opening statement. Though the trial team 
wanted to anticipate contrary arguments from defense counsel, a colleague warned them 
that such vagueness might lead jurors to believe they would hear something harmful to 
the government’s case.67 “It implies this case is so nuanced that if you don’t get all of the 
details, you can’t convict,” he continued. “But that’s not the case at all.”68 
 At the same time that prosecutors considered the risk of later contradiction (or 
benefit of later corroboration) they did not want to be perceived as withholding evidence 
that did not support their cases. They referred to the practice of sharing ambiguous or 
unfavorable information during opening statements as “fronting” evidence.69 An aim of 
this technique was to demonstrate their candor to jurors.70 When a prosecutor was not 
certain how defense counsel would use evidence that a defendant only offered 
commissions on some of the bribes he solicited, for example, a supervisor encouraged 
him to bring this detail out in his opening lest jurors think to themselves, “they never told 
                                                                                                                                                              
65 Participation in meeting with EJ, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, (Feb. 6, 2015) urging a colleague to avoid “wishy 
washy adjectives like “somewhat” or refer to “some” of the defendants’ conduct as illegal. 
66 Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (Sept. 3, 2013); see also participation in meeting with BB 
(Jun. 21, 2013); Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (July 1, 2014). 
67 Participation in meeting with AG, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, (Jun. 7, 2013). 
68 Id., his emphasis. 
69 See e.g., Participation in meetings, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (Feb. 21, 2017; May 4, 2017). 
70 Meeting with DN, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, (July 17, 2015) during which prosecutor explained that “Out of 47 
trials I’ve never lost one. I know I’m good at what I do and know how to differentiate myself from my 
opponents by showing I’m trustworthy, believable, likable, and have good evidence”; see also Participation 
in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (Oct. 9, 2014).  
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us that!”71 In a healthcare fraud case that unfolded over a 14-month period and consisted 
of two illegal transactions, a colleague worried that representing the crime as taking place 
over “more than a year” and involving “more than one transaction” could lead jurors to 
expect evidence of a larger scheme. In a similar vein, a prosecutor warned a colleague in 
a different case not to “overplay or underplay” the extent to which a defendant tried to 
run away from two police officers by “twisting” his body, since neither officer described 
the maneuver clearly and later contradiction could affect the jury’s assessment of the trial 
team and witnesses’ truthfulness.72 
 Prosecutors’ commitment to maintaining jurors’ trust led some to make a concerted 
effort to communicate in an informal, relatable, and conversational manner.73 In one such 
case, a prosecutor’s effective connection with her listeners during a preparation meeting 
was lauded as the culmination of continued practice.74 The absence of such a connection 
was considered a shortcoming in other prosecutors’ presentations.75 The stakes of 
establishing a rapport with jurors, in some prosecutors’ view, were high. One prosecutor 
thought that if he seemed like someone a juror would want to “hang out” with, that 
person might be more likely to listen to and trust him.76 Other prosecutors were attuned 
to whether they (or their trial partners) had “some kind of simpatico” or felt a personal 
connection with a particular juror during voir dire.77 
                                                      
71 Participation in meeting with AA, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, (Feb. 21, 2017).  
72 Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (April 3, 2014).  
73 Participation in meeting with AA, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, (Feb. 6, 2015); Participation in meeting with FA 
(Feb. 21, 2017).  
74 Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (June 7, 2013). 
75 See e.g., Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (June 19, 2013) during which a prosecutor advised 
his colleague to “connect with the jury for a few minutes” rather than begin an opening statement with a 
slideshow. 
76 Interview with BT, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, ( June 28, 2013). 
77 See e.g., Interview with BD, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, ( June 20, 2013); Discussion with DN, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, 
(May 23, 2017). 
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Many prosecutors felt that demonstrations of their preparedness by memorizing 
details in their cases signaled to jurors that they took their jobs and audience seriously.78 
In a gun possession case, for example, a prosecutor emphasized the importance of 
confidently describing the weapon’s name, model, size, and place of origin. “I’ve done a 
lot of gun cases,” she explained, “and I like to know that gun. I hold it up and say ‘this is 
a BLANK’, without looking down, because that goes to my credibility. I know this gun. 
This is my case. You’re going to have it in your hand and look right at them as you say 
it.”79 Echoing this sentiment, another prosecutor agreed that references to minutia 
 
show you know what’s going to happen— you’re in command of this case. Like, 
“I know all the facts and I’m going to tell you, some of these witnesses are going 
to be a little problematic, and here’s why: The stuff they did was illegal.” So to 
me it just shows you have control of the case.80 
 
Detailed references, these prosecutors agreed, might enhance their credibility by 
exhibiting their own factual proficiency. Correspondingly, in light of the value conferred 
on precision, prosecutors’ misstatements of evidence— or displays of inconsistent facts 
on PowerPoint slides— were sharply criticized because of their anticipated impact on 
jurors.81  
                                                      
78 Interview with DD, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, ( July 16, 2013); Interview with AE, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, ( June 11, 
2013); Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (June 19, 2013). 
79 Participation in meeting with EF, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, (April 3, 2014), her emphasis. 
80 Participation in meeting with BT, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, (Feb. 6, 2015).  
81 See e.g., Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (Jan. 8, 2015); see also Participation in meeting 
with EI and AJ, Ass’t U.S. Att’ys (May 5, 2017). 
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Prosecutors were also conscious that the language they used could affect 
perceptions of the criminality of defendants’ conduct. To this end, prosecutors tried to 
underscore the illegitimate and illegal dimensions of defendants’ behavior. Comments 
from a meeting in preparation for a car theft trial exemplified this approach. Here, a 
prosecutor pointed out that  
 
when you use words like “contracts” and “employees” it makes it seem like a 
legitimate business. You may want to do a little up front on the legitimate aspect 
of the business but say that we’re talking about the illegitimate thing. This will 
give context. So throw it up front and introduce the concept.82  
 
Another colleague offered advice along similar lines, suggesting the lead prosecutor 
“explain all the things she did in her illegal enterprise to steal cars.”83 Rather than use 
words and phrases like “businesswoman,” “business associate,” “partner,” and “profit for 
her business,” he recommended language that drew attention to the defendant’s 
wrongdoing— such as “co-conspirator” and “illegal enterprise.”84  
 A political corruption case raised similar concerns for a prosecutor who observed: 
 
I don’t think I heard the word kickback once. It was like, “he made a 
recommendation and he got a share.” That sounded pretty legitimate to me. I 
                                                      
82 Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (June 7, 2013). 
83 Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (June 7, 2013), his emphasis. 
84 Participation in meetings, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (June 7, 2013; Jan. 7 2014; Jan. 8, 2014; July 1, 2014); 
Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (Oct. 18, 2016) during which a prosecutor encouraged a 
colleague to “channel a little more skepticism” in his descriptions; Participation in meeting with AW, Ass’t 
U.S. Att’y, (May 4, 2017) during which a colleague advised a trial team to describe the defendant as 
stealing rather than taking money from a bank.  
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would say, instead of “he helped get them hired, he got a piece of the action”, “he 
helped get them hired, he got a kickback.” It’s a kickback case and I don’t think 
we say kickback.85  
 
A colleague who participated in this meeting suggested the opening statement be revised 
to sound “bribyer.” Despite the narrative’s strong delivery, “at the end of the day… it’s 
just a matter of tightening it up and bribing it up a little more, frauding it up, and 
extorting it up a little.”86 These comments echoed others in criminal cases in which 
colleagues recommended identifying “the defendant” (rather than “he” or “she”), 
referring to cooperators as “co-conspirators”87 and using words like “hitting” instead of 
“discipline”88 which reinforced the illegality of the conduct they described. Prosecutors 
also recommended characterizing defendants’ actions in active voice when possible: “he 
told her he hid the files”, for example, rather than “he told her the files were locked 
up.”89  
 Underlying some prosecutors’ careful attention to word choice was broader concern 
that jurors might fail to view a defendant— or his conduct— as criminal. Their narrative 
work thus embraced an obligation to accurately characterize, explain, and communicate 
the significance of the laws at issue in their cases. Discussion of a convicted felon 
charged with carrying a firearm was instructive in this regard:  
 
                                                      
85 Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (Feb. 6, 2015). 
86 Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (Feb. 6, 2015).  
87 Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (June 7, 2015).  
88 Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (Oct. 9, 2014). 
89 Participation in meeting with AJ, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, (Feb. 21, 2017). 
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Luis: You started [the opening] with the law— and I wouldn’t. I always start with 
a grabber fact— and I’m not a big fan of starting with the law. You could say, 
“the defendant had just committed a traffic infraction” with just two or three 
sentences of description— just hitting them with a fact. Something brief. Like 
“they were on patrol in a high crime area and saw someone speeding. But what 
happened next was quite unusual…” 
 
Ava: Is it? I wouldn't say it’s quite unusual… 
 
Ken: I disagree…  
 
Ava: Otherwise, people will be thinking, “why is the U.S. government caring? 
This is just a gun case.” So the federal part is important— because why are we 
here on a gun case? Why is the government wasting its time and resources… 
 
Ken: …it’s illegal under federal law… 
 
Luis: You’ve got to get into the cadence— looking at the jury— and just grabbing 
them… “What happened next was quite unusual. And why?” 
 
Ken: But a lot of people don’t know carrying a gun is a crime. Usually I’d agree 
with you, but not here. It’s a matter of style, there’s no right way to do it… 
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Luis: See, I disagree. It just doesn't grab you… 
 
Lena [the author of the draft statement]: I read four opening transcripts for gun 
possession cases and they all started with the law….90  
 
One can quickly appreciate the group’s attentiveness to the question of whether an 
opening should begin with a hook meant to grab and engage listeners, or outline the law a 
defendant was charged with breaking.91 The stakes of this decision for some of the 
prosecutors who discussed it, however, were higher. What if jurors saw nothing wrong 
with the defendant’s conduct? Both Ken and Ava emphasized the possibility that for a 
layperson unfamiliar with laws restricting felons’ right to possess guns, a narrative that 
failed to flag this fact might confuse jurors— or worse— make them question the 
prosecutors’ judgment. Ideas about narrative sequence were thus tied to prosecutors’ 
conceptions of their professional roles. Accepting the risk of boring jurors, Ken believed 
that the trial team’s obligation to assert the legitimacy of a case should trump concern 
about how to order the events in their story.  
 Prosecutors also sought to demonstrate their credibility by inviting jurors to carry 
out narrative work of their own. This entailed presenting themselves as neutral purveyors 
of independent and mutually reinforcing evidence of wrongdoing. As a practical matter, 
this also meant emphasizing that distinct pieces of evidence could lead one to the same 
conclusion about a defendant’s guilt. Jurors could interpret complementary, overlapping, 
                                                      
90 Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (April 17, 2014). 
91 See e.g., Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (Oct. 9, 2014); Participation in meeting with BS, 
Ass’t U.S. Att’y, (Dec. 1, 2015) encouraging the inclusion of a “punchy first sentence” that would tell a 
story “up front.”  
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or “lined up” accounts of a defendant’s actions, in other words, as evidence of their 
facticity.92 This approach was distinguished from presentations that appeared to rely on 
discrete pieces of evidence (e.g., surveillance footage, DNA evidence, eyewitness 
testimony) as though each existed in a vacuum. The skillful closing statement or rebuttal, 
in contrast, directed jurors’ attention to “all those things taken together.”93  
 The narrative significance of corroborating evidence emerged with particular force 
during a child abuse prosecution. To support her theory of the defendants’ medical 
neglect of their children, the case’s lead prosecutor planned to show the jury medical 
records that documented doctors’ referrals to seek immediate follow-up treatment and the 
defendants’ subsequent failure to follow through. She would then show the jury records 
generated by administrators listing numerous appointments the defendants had cancelled 
or missed. During a commute home, the prosecutor described her assembly of multiple 
narratives of neglect as “leaving no stone unturned,” allowing the jury to “cross-check” 
her claims.94 This prosecutor, like others, underscored the value of offering several 
accounts of the same conduct to reinforce her own credibility in the event that jurors 
chose not to believe a particular witness.95 In closing statements and rebuttals, 
prosecutors sometimes stressed the fact that their cases relied on distinct but 
complementary pieces of evidence to anticipate or address defense counsel’s arguments. 
This was a move that explicitly placed interpretive and inferential work in jurors' hands.96 
If jurors connected the dots themselves, prosecutors might emerge as neutral and 
                                                      
92 See e.g., Participation in meeting with AZ, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, (June 20, 2013).  
93 See e.g., Participation in meeting with CZ, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, (May 5, 2017), his emphasis. 
94 Discussion with AY, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, (March 26, 2015).  
95 Id.  
96 See e.g., Participation in meeting with AA, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, (May 4, 2017) during which a prosecutor 
encouraged the deliverer of an opening statement to find the defendant guilty on the strength of their own 
identification of him using video surveillance footage and contemporaneous photographs.  
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therefore more reliable curators of their evidence.  
 A human trafficking prosecution illustrated this approach further. In this case, a 
victim named Jessica testified that she was locked in a basement and forced to have sex 
with strangers. When questioned by defense counsel, however, her description of this 
experience did not match the prosecutors’ opening statement. “It’s impossible to imagine 
how it could have gone worse,” a member of the trial team commented at the end of the 
first day of her cross-examination. “She was terrible— she complete derailed— gave 
stuff up— made new stuff up that was a whole new story— different from her grand jury 
testimony and different from this, and then would just sit there.”97 His thoughts turned to 
his future closing statement. He planned to ask the jury to do a “thought experiment” by 
“imagin[ing] that she didn’t testify.” Setting aside Jessica’s testimony altogether, the jury 
could still return a guilty verdict. Other witnesses’ recollections of the same events, he 
would argue, could lead jurors to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
was guilty. And jurors could reach this conclusion themselves.98 
 Prosecutors also considered the potential for jurors to view witnesses’ later 
narratives as corroborating their opening statements. Recognizing the additive value of 
these contextualizing accounts, one prosecutor viewed them as “a stamp on all the 
arguments and evidence you’ve presented” and a means of “buttressing” particular 
witnesses’ credibility.99 Another prosecutor noted, in reference to a cooperating witness’s 
testimony, that “it bolsters my credibility when the jury says ‘yeah, we heard about that 
before in the opening.’”100 This included the possibility that jurors might notice aspects 
                                                      
97 Discussion with trial team, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (July 22, 2015), his emphasis.  
98 See e.g., Participation in meeting with EM, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, (May 5, 2017). 
99 Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (June 28, 2015).  
100 Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office,  (June 19, 2015); Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s 
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of opening and closing statements that were inconsistent, leading colleagues to urge trial 
partners to reconcile their own competing narratives before trial.101  
 
2. Mitigating perceptions of the overzealous prosecutor 
 
While discussing opening statements, prosecutors also critiqued behavior that a 
hypothetical juror might consider overzealous. Though not defined explicitly, prosecutors 
articulated different indices of this undesirable quality. This included appearing 
excessively argumentative, confrontational, disrespectful or dismissive when 
characterizing witnesses or evidence.102 Jurors' presence, even in hypothetical form, thus 
invited prosecutors to share their own common sense understandings of how to 
distinguish reasonable from excessive advocacy in criminal prosecutions. Returning to 
the Caprica case that began this article, another exchange illustrated the shifting meaning 
of this unwanted attribute. In the excerpt below, a prosecutor named David challenged 
the trial team’s decision to have the defendant’s mother testify against him in court 
despite the fact that her name, address, and signature on forged loan applications 
implicated her in the scheme.  
 
Ken: OK, so you could go through it like that… You’re getting the mother to 
testify?  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
Office, (Jan. 8, 2015) in which the metaphor of gravy on meat was invoked during a strategy meeting to 
emphasize the additive quality of corroborating evidence. 
101 See e.g., Participation in meeting with AJ, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, (May 5, 2017). 
102 See e.g., Participation in meeting with AJ and CZ, Ass’t U.S. Att’ys, (May 5, 2017).  
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Alex: Yeah, she’s going to say that she never signed any documents…  
 
David: Prep the jury for that, so they don’t think we’re being overzealous…  
 
Ken: You’re getting his sister, too?  
 
Alex: Yeah, she’s listed on the form as a loan processor. 
 
David: At some point, you should allude to the unpleasant task the defendant has 
forced the government to do… 
 
Ken:  Is there another way to do this? Could you get tax returns… for the 
mother?103 
 
Here, David made his concern about government overzealousness explicit. Despite the 
legality of calling a defendant’s family member as a witness, he explained after the 
meeting that he found this tactic problematic:   
 
I could understand [this approach] in a murder case— but this is fraud. How is the 
government going to appear? If I have a father and he’s not going to lie on the 
stand, what good is he? If I have a kid and I won’t lie for him, what’s the point?104 
 
                                                      
103 Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (Jan. 28, 2014), his emphasis. 
104 Discussion with AM, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, (June 18, 2013). 
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David’s hesitation about bringing the defendant’s mother and sister to court reflected his 
intuition that jurors might share his sense that requiring family members to testify against 
each other was unfair.105 He thus imputed his common sense idea about just mortgage 
fraud prosecutions to the trial team’s future audience of lay decision-makers. Ken, who 
found this argument compelling, responded with an alternative approach that helped his 
colleagues prove the fraudulence of the loan application with tax documents instead.  
Prosecutors’ sensitivity to jurors’ perception of overzealousness also entered 
discussions of how to characterize cooperating witnesses. On the one hand, cooperators 
promised to testify truthfully in the hope of receiving lighter sentences in return for their 
assistance.  On the other hand, they engaged in criminal activity themselves— sometimes 
the same criminal activity as defendants. Though prosecutors did not want to endorse the 
behavior that brought cooperating witnesses in contact with law enforcement agents, they 
navigated this fraught relationship with care. In the conversation below, for instance, 
Maria critiqued her colleague’s use of derogatory language to describe cooperating 
witnesses while acknowledging that her opinion might shift from one case to the next: 
 
Maria: You call the co-conspirators “crooks” and “fraudsters.” I’d have a lighter 
touch on the people who testify. I know you’re getting this from my work 
product… 
 
George: Yeah, this is coming straight from Maria's opening… 
 
                                                      
105 See also Discussion with DN, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, (May 23, 2017) “... [F]amily members against family 
members is kind of distasteful—you don’t want a kid testifying against their parent.” 
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Maria: But in my case, they weren’t testifying, so I had a little more license to 
dump on them. There’s another way to say it— not as pejoratively.106  
 
As we see here, cooperating witnesses presented a continuing dilemma for prosecutors 
who sought to differentiate themselves from admitted criminals.  
 Opening statements that appeared to vouch for, praise, or depict cooperating 
witnesses as victims were also subject to criticism. This is because one could not predict 
exactly what such witnesses would say or how truthful their testimony would seem to 
jurors. In one case, a prosecutor advised a colleague to explain that a cooperator said he 
didn’t know that a transaction was illegal so that the deliverer of the statement did not 
implicitly vouch for his truthfulness.107 In another case, a prosecutor responded to a 
colleague’s comment that a cooperator wanted to start his life with a clean slate and “new 
beginning” by commenting that “unless you’re really confident the jury’s going to buy 
that he turned his life around, I wouldn’t vouch for it… You don’t know how this guy is 
going to come across.”108 In this context, the witness was charged with crimes he 
committed after signing an agreement with the government— a fact believed to tarnish 
jurors’ opinions of him and undermine their confidence in lawyers who appeared to take 
him at his word. 
 In an effort to mitigate a hypothetical juror’s perception that they vouched for 
witnesses, prosecutors encouraged each other to adjust their word choice. One prosecutor, 
for example, suggested that a colleague use an impersonal construction when 
characterizing a cooperating witness’s testimony by saying “the evidence is going to 
                                                      
106 Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (Jan. 28, 2014), her emphasis. 
107 Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (June 7, 2013), emphasis added.  
108 Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (June 19, 2013). 
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show” rather than “we’re going to provide evidence” to insulate herself from 
responsibility for his statements.109 Another prosecutor addressed this concern by 
encouraging a colleague to explain that the defendant chose the cooperating witnesses.110 
If asked to believe the uncorroborated testimony of a witness they disliked, jurors might 
transfer their distrust or animus to the trial team instead.111  
 Prosecutors also critiqued opening statements that appeared to empathize with 
witnesses. When an opening statement involved witnesses who were undocumented 
immigrants, for example, a supervisor objected to a section of a draft that described them 
as gathering money to pay bribes from their “hard-earned paychecks.”112 In light of some 
Americans’ apparent support for President Donald Trump’s stance on immigration, he 
worried that jurors might view undocumented witnesses as earning money at the expense 
of law-abiding citizens. “I don’t know how much we want to make them into victims,” he 
said.113  
Others more explicitly associated the value of precise language with their roles as 
“honest brokers” who refrained from “overt argumentation.”114 A prosecutor’s critique of 
an opening statement reflected this concern. “When explaining the five transactions you 
want to be a teacher,” he said:  
 
                                                      
109 See e.g., Participation in meetings, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (Jan. 28, 2015; May 5, 2017).  
110 Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (Jan. 7, 2014) during which a prosecutor commented that 
“the government didn’t pick these two, the defendant did when she decided to take kickbacks.” 
111 Discussion with DH, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, (May 23, 2017). 
112 Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (Feb. 21, 2017).  
113 Participation in meeting with AA, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, (Feb. 21, 2017); see also Participation in meeting, 
U.S. Att’y’s Office, (April 17, 2014).  
114 Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (July 9, 2013). 
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Just talk to them. I know that you enunciate words, but you have to let them flow 
together and be a regular person.115  
 
In this colleague’s view, the opening statement’s emphatic delivery distanced its author 
from her lay audience. Another lawyer thought the same opening statement had been “too 
dramatic” in its opening lines, noting that the story improved as its deliverer “calmed 
down” and spoke “natural[ly].”116  
 As a general practice in cases with ambiguous evidence, prosecutors erred on the 
side of understatement, weighing emphatic claims against jurors’ imagined skepticism 
and defense counsel’s imagined counterarguments. In a wire fraud case, for example, a 
supervisor implored the deliverer of an opening statement not to characterize a 
defendant’s confession as “the most devastating evidence of all.”117 Since the defendant 
did not concede that he lied to the victim or committed wire fraud, the supervisor advised 
the trial team to proceed with caution: “When I hear confession,” he explained, “I’m 
thinking ‘I robbed the bank. I aimed the gun at the bank teller…’ That’s a confession and 
this is a little different.”118 
Language or visual aids perceived to exaggerate or overstate evidence were 
criticized along similar lines. Discomfort displaying photographs prompted one 
prosecutor to refer to their inclusion as turning an opening statement into a “dog and 
pony show”119 and another to comment that if they were going to be used as evidence of 
physical injuries, photographs should have a “blockbuster” effect that would bowl the 
                                                      
115 Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (Jan. 8, 2015). 
116 Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (Jan. 8, 2015). 
117 Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (April 19, 2017).  
118 Id., his emphasis. 
119 Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (Jan. 28, 2015). 
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jury over or not be used at all.120 To this end, another response to the Caprica opening 
was illustrative:  
 
I would also be careful about not overcommitting to evidence. You say 60 to 80 
percent of mortgages, but you don’t know he’ll testify to that. I’d say “majority” 
or something squishier.121  
 
This sense of the value of “exact” language was shared by a prosecutor who cautioned 
the deliverer of another opening statement not to set jurors up to expect something “huge 
and earth-shattering” that might not be perceived as such.122 During the same meeting, a 
prosecutor advised another colleague not to “bomb-throw” after a peer suggested that 
“the opening line should be grabbing them [i.e., jurors] by the scruff of their neck.”  
The creative and imaginative labor that prosecutors devoted to reformulating case 
stories illuminated their divergent ideas about the relationship between advocacy and 
professionalism. Though overzealousness— like their broader obligation to seek 
justice— lacked explicit definition, prosecutors’ discussions revealed differing 
approaches to their case preparation. Reference to hypothetical jurors thus created an 
opening for prosecutors to bring distinct understandings of their professional 
responsibilities (however aspirational) to critiques of colleagues’ work. 
Conclusion 
                                                      
120 See e.g., Participation in meetings, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (Oct. 9, 2014; May 5, 2017). 
121 Participation in meeting with DC, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, (Jan. 28, 2014); Participation in meetings, U.S. 
Att’y’s Office, (April 3, 2014; April 18, 2014; July 1, 2014; Jan. 8, 2015).  
122 Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (Jan. 8, 2015) during which a prosecutor commented that a 
colleague sounded as though he was welcoming jurors “to the greatest show on earth… when, really, a 
police officer is going to testify who analyzed all the records”; see also Participation in meeting, U.S. 
Att’y’s Office, (Jan. 7, 2014); Participation in meeting with EL, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, (Jan. 8, 2015); 
Participation in meeting, U.S. Att’y’s Office, (Feb. 21, 2017). 
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Reflecting on the role of lay decision-makers during case preparation, a 
prosecutor explained that “the jury forces us to really think about whether we should do 
something that we can do in terms of a case.”123 As this article suggests, the “should” of 
justice does not assume a singular or stable form. Conceptions of the just prosecutor— 
and just prosecution— are subject to continual discussion and reformulation as trial 
narratives take shape. Through references to jurors’ perspectives, prosecutors explain 
their professional commitments to each other and to themselves. In the process of 
commenting on evidence and witnesses and developing their authorial voices, 
prosecutors explicitly and implicitly articulate character traits and values they view as 
central to their jobs. Part I examined narrative techniques that prosecutors deployed and 
contested with jurors in mind, including their use of analogies and attentiveness to their 
role as translators for a lay audience. Focusing on prosecutors’ collaborative work in real 
time, Part II highlighted the substantive and structural implications of prosecutors’ 
concern that jurors might perceive them as incredible or overzealous.  
 Attention to legal storytelling in real time offers a corrective to studies that treat 
prosecutors, legal language, or “Law” more generally, as monolithic. The social process 
by which prosecutors create and revise opening statement narratives brings to light the 
contingency of their work. This research also offers a window into the vital role of lay 
knowledge to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion as lawyers scrutinize their 
professional identities and character through jurors’ eyes. In some cases, prosecutors 
draw on information related to jurors’ jobs, families, hobbies, and social affiliations 
elicited during voir dire. More often, however, prosecutors rely on their own local 
knowledge to imaginatively and empathically inhabit jurors’ roles. In this manner, the 
                                                      
123 Interview with AM, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, ( June 18, 2013), his emphasis. 
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presence of jurors keys prosecutors’ decision-making to lay opinions and interpretations. 
Ordinary citizens, both real and imagined, are thus tied to the creative and collaborative 
process of making legal narratives. 
